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An organization engaging in more than an insubstantial
amount of lobbying cannot qualify for exemption from income
taxation under Internal Revenue Code section 501(c)(3), and thus
is not eligible to receive contributions which are deductible for
income, estate, and gift tax purposes.' While this limitation on the
legislative activities of section 501(c)(3) organizations has been a
part of the Code since 1934, prior to the Tax Reform Act of 19762
no real definition or content had been given to the "substantial
activities" standard. The fact that neither Congress, the Internal
Revenue Service, nor, until recently, the courts found it necessary
or desirable to provide to either the exempt organizations or to the
administrative agents useful guidelines with regard to what was
substantial lobbying activity resulted in a reluctance by many
charitable organizations to lobby to any extent and in a feeling of
insecurity in those organizations which chose to lobby. Due to this
lack of guidelines and the resulting inconsistencies in the statute's
enforcement, organizations with legislative programs which were
found to be substantial frequently perceived themselves to be the
victims of selective enforcement. Compounding the problem pre-
sented to the 501(c)(3) organizations by the law's uncertainty was
the severe consequence of a determination that the organization
had engaged in substantial lobbying; the result was that the organ-
* Associate, Jackson, Kelly, Holt & O'Farrell, Charleston, West Virginia.
A.B., Duke University, 1971; J.D., University of Colorado, 1974; M.L.T., George-
town University, 1977. Member, West Virginia Bar, District of Columbia Bar.
I.R.C. §§ 170(c)(2), 2055(a)(2), 2522(a)(2).
2 Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1520 (amending various provisions of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954, codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
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ization would lose its exempt status unless it was able to qualify
under some other subsection of 501(c). In any event, following such
a determination the organization would lose its right to receive
deductible contributions; thus the primary sources of the organiza-
tion's support would dry up, and in most cases the effective exist-
ence of the organization would end.
In response to a rising volume of criticism and in an effort to
eliminate the vagueness of the statute, in 1976 Congress enacted
an elective set of objective standards for determining whether a
public charity has engaged in "substantial" lobbying. This article
will examine the provisions of this legislation and the alternative
to making the election under the new provisions, and then will
discuss the factors which the charitable organizations should con-
sider in deciding whether to make the election to come under the
objective standards.
THE 1976 LEGISLATION
An organization otherwise qualifying for exemption under sec-
tion 501(c)(3) will be denied such exemption unless "no substan-
tial part" of its activities "is carrying on propaganda, or otherwise
attempting, to influence legislation. ' '3 As amended by the Tax
Reform Act of 1976, Internal Revenue Code sections 501(h) and
4911 now provide that a public charity may elect to have the sub-
stantiality of its legislative activity determined on the basis of a
sliding scale which defines the permissible limits of lobbying in
terms of the organization's expenditures for influencing legislation.
The basic level of permissible expenditures for an electing organi-
zation (i.e., the "lobbying nontaxable amount") is 20 percent of
the first $500,000 of the organization's "exempt purpose expendi-
tures" for the year, plus 15 percent of the second $500,000, plus 10
percent of the third $500,000, plus 5 percent of any additional
expenditures. In no event, however, may an organization's lobby-
ing nontaxable amount exceed $1,000,000. Within this overall limi-
tation on lobbying expenditures is a second limitation on amounts
expended to influence the general public on legislative matters.
The permissible level of expenditures for such grass roots lobbying
(i.e., the "grass roots nontaxable amount") is one-fourth of the
lobbying nontaxable amount.
An organization which exceeds either of these expenditure
limitations in a given taxable year will be subject to a nondeducti-
ble excise tax of 25 percent of its excess expenditures. If both
limitations are exceeded, then the tax will be determined on the
- I.R.C. § 501(c)(3).
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basis of the greater of the two excess amounts. If the organization's
lobbying expenditures "normally" (i.e., on the average over a four
year period) exceed the lobbying nontaxable amount or the grass
roots nontaxable amount by more than 50 percent (i.e., normally
exceed the "lobbying ceiling amount" or the "grass roots ceiling
amount"), then the organization will be deemed to have engaged
in substantial lobbying activity and thus will lose its section
501(c)(3) tax exempt status. Section 504, also added to the Code
in 1976, prevents an organization which loses its exempt status by
reason of excess lobbying from becoming an exempt section
501(c) (4) social welfare organization.
The 1976 legislation provides definitions of the critical termi-
nology and rules to assure obedience to the spirit as well as the
letter of the statute. Section 4911(d) defines "influencing legisla-
tion" to include both grass roots lobbying and direct lobbying of
those in positions to participate in the formulation of legislation.
The statute then significantly narrows the scope of activities sub-
ject to the new expenditure limitations by excepting certain cate-
gories of activity from the general definition.4 Section 4911(e) de-
fines "exempt purpose expenditures" and provides rules for com-
puting the amount of expenditures paid or incurred for the purpose
of influencing legislation.5 Rules to forestall the creation of numer-
ous commonly controlled organizations for the purpose of avoiding
the expenditure limitations are provided at section 4911(f). Fi-
nally, the 1976 Reform Act added section 170(f) (6) which prevents
the circumvention of the expenditure limitations by disallowing an
individual's deduction of out-of-pocket expenditures on behalf of
a charitable organization if such expenditures are made for the
purpose of influencing legislation.
The section 501(h) election is not available to (1) churches,
integrated auxiliaries of churches, or organizations affiliated with
churches; (2) organizations which are public charities because they
are support organizations for certain types of social welfare organi-
zations, labor unions, or trade associations; or (3) private founda-
tions. Generally speaking, it is those organizations commonly con-
sidered to be public charities which may elect to have the substan-
tiality of their lobbying activities determined under these expendi-
ture limitations.' Organizations which are ineligible to make the
section 501(h) election and nonelecting organizations will continue
See discussion in text accompanying note 61, infra.
See discussion in text accompanying notes 35-39, infra.
See discussion in text accompanying notes 22-31, infra.
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to be subject to the law as it existed prior to the introduction of
these new provisions.
7
In addition to these objective limitations on lobbying, the Tax
Reform Act of 1976 added section 7428,8 another provision which
is of particular significance to charitable organizations threatened
with loss of exempt status. This provision, in relevant part, author-
izes the Tax Court, the Court of Claims, and the U.S. District
Court for the District of Columbia to make declarations with re-
spect to the continuing qualification of charitable organizations in
cases where there is an actual controversy involving an I.R.S. de-
termination with respect to such qualification. This prerevocation
declaratory judgment procedure is in contrast to prior law under
which the only recourse for a charitable organization whose exempt
status was revoked was to sue for a refund of taxes paid. The
problem under the old law was that the organization's ability to
attract charitable contributions was lost during the period between
revocation and review and the organization would frequently die
from lack of support. This new procedure places charitable organi-
zations in a position where it is practical to contest unjustifiable
or arbitrary administrative demands.
PRIOR LAW: THE ALTERNATIVE STANDARD
The determination of whether attempts to influence legisla-
tion are a substantial part of a section 501(c)(3) organization's
activities is a factual one. Prior to the introduction of sections
501(h) and 4911 to the Code by the Tax Reform Act of 1976, there
was no simple rule offering guidance as to what amount of activity
would be considered substantial; the Service had not dealt with
this issue in either the regulations or in its rulings. For organiza-
tions ineligible to make the 501(h) election and for eligible organi-
zations choosing not to make the election, this situation continues.
While the concept of substantiality has in this context defied
definition by the Service, cases which have had to deal with the
issue give indications of the factors which the courts find impor-
tant in determining whether lobbying is a substantial part of an
organization's activities. In the most recent decisions addressing
this issue, Christian Echoes National Ministry, Inc. v. United
States' and Haswell v. United States,10 the courts have agreed that
to determine the substantiality of an organization's attempts to
influence legislation it is necessary to balance the lobbying activi-
7 I.R.C. § 501(h)(7).
I.R.C. § 7428.
470 F.2d 849 (10th Cir. 1972).
z 500 F.2d 1133 (Ct. C1. 1974).
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ties of the organization in the context of the objectives and circum-
stances of the organization. In Christian Echoes, the government
had revoked the tax exemption of the plaintiff on the basis of a
finding that a substantial part of the organization's activities con-
sisted of carrying on propaganda, or otherwise attempting to influ-
ence legislation." The government contended that the organiza-
tion's program of radio and television broadcasts, evangelical cam-
paigns, and publications of magazines, newspaper columns, and
leaflets included substantial attempts to influence legislation.
Consistent with the organization's mission, which was described
by its founder as a battle against communism, socialism, and pol-
itical liberalism, the organization's publications appealed to read-
ers to write to their congressmen, to work for or oppose specific
pending legislation, and to try to exert other influence in the politi-
cal sector. Their objectives included such specifics as limitation of
foreign aid, withdrawal from the United Nations, termination of
diplomatic relations with communist countries, and abolishment
of the federal income tax. The organization's broadcasts and evan-
gelical campaigns contained similar appeals. Balancing these ac-
tivities in the context of the organization's objectives and other
efforts, the court agreed with the government's conclusion and
found that the promotion of governmental policies consistent with
its objectives was an essential part of the program of Christian
Echoes and that the activities of Christian Echoes in influencing
or attempting to influence legislation were not incidental, but were
substantial and continuous. Accordingly the revocation of the ex-
empt status of Christian Echoes was upheld.
The issue in Haswell v. United States'2 was the deductibility
of the taxpayer's contributions to the National Association of Rail-
road Passengers in 1967 and 1968. The government contended that
the contributions were not deductible because the organization
was not operated exclusively for a section 170(c)(2)(B) purpose
since a substantial part of its activities involved attempts to influ-
ence legislation. The goals of the N.A.R.P. were to attain (1) ade-
quate legal control over train discontinuances, (2) fair and equal
treatment of railroad passengers by the government, and (3) a
national transportation policy in which railroad passenger service
was an essential element. The N.A.R.P. program included educa-
tional activities to inform the public of the problems of railroad
" Participation or intervention in political campaigns on behalf of candidates
for public office was an alternate and independent ground for revocation. 470 F.2d
at 853.
12 500 F.2d 1133 (Ct. Cl. 1974).
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passengers, litigation before the Interstate Commerce Commission
and other regulatory agencies to oppose specific proposals for dis-
continuance of passenger train service, and attempts to influence
legislation. To better focus its lobbying efforts, the N.A.R.P. had
contracted with a lobbying consulting firm, which, during the
years in question, arranged for the N.A.R.P. to present testimony
at various committee hearings, organized cocktail parties for legis-
lators at which the N.A.R.P. could make known its views, and
made various other contacts with members of Congress. In examin-
ing the substantiality of these activities, the court found that in
1967 approximately $10,000 of a total budget of $50,000 was spent
on lobbying, and that in 1968 approximately $20,000 of a total
budget of $100,000 was spent on lobbying. While the amounts ex-
pended to influence legislation were not great, the fact that in each
year the organization's lobbying expenditures were approximately
twenty percent of total expenditures indicated to the court the
relative importance of these activities to the organization's pro-
gram as a whole. Furthermore, the court found that these legisla-
tive efforts were of fundamental importance to the organization in
the achievement of its goals. Based on these findings, the court
concluded that the N.A.R.P. was engaged in substantial lobbying.
Therefore, the taxpayer was not entitled to the claimed deduc-
tions.
At least some of the factors which may influence a court's
decision are indicated by these decisions. These factors include the
amount of money spent on lobbying and the relative importance
of that amount to the organization's total budget, the importance
of lobbying to the achievement of the objectives of the organiza-
tion, and the continuity of the attempts by the organization to
influence legislation. The time and effort expended by members or
employees of an organization is another very relevant factor." But
these are only factors. In a given case there may be other equally
relevant considerations, and the presence or absence of any one of
these enumerated factors may not be determinative. For example,
in League of Women Voters of United States v. United States," it
,3 It was suggested in the hearings on the new legislation that the impact or
importance of an organization's legislative efforts was a significant factor in the
view of the Service. Hearings on H.R. 10612 Before the Senate Committee on
Finance, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess. 3263 (1976) (statement of Elvis Stahr, Chairman,
Coalition of Concerned Charities). While in terms of visibility (and therefore of
detection) of excessive lobbying impact may be significant, such impact is irrele-
vant to the issue of substantiality.
" 180 F. Supp. 379 (Ct. Cl. 1960).
[Vol. 81
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was held that a bequest to the League of Women Voters was not
deductible for estate tax purposes because the League had engaged
in substantial lobbying. The Court of Claims determined that al-
though a relatively insignificant amount of money was spent on
direct attempts to influence legislation, a very substantial portion
of the energies and efforts of the League members was spent in
formulating the League's position on various legislative issues and
on attempts to induce legislative action in accordance with the
League's position. Furthermore, the court found that influencing
legislation was really the ultimate purpose of the League's educa-
tional program. In these circunistances, the absence of significant
expenditures was not of controlling importance.
As illustrated by League of Women Voters, the substantiality
of the lobbying activities of an organization may be dependent on
which of the organization's activities are characterized as
"propaganda, or other attempts, to influence legislation,"'15 and
indeed this characterization is often the central problem in cases
where substantial lobbying is an issue. Once this determination of
the nature of the organization's activities is made, the substantial-
ity of the lobbying activities in the context of the organization's
total program is frequently self-evident.'6 This definitional prob-
lem and its effect on an organization's decision to exercise the
section 501(h) election will be discussed in detail in a following
section of this article.
Prior to the introduction of section 501(h) to the Code, courts
generally rejected any suggestion that a determination of substan-
tiality should be made on a strict percentage basis. The courts
evidently reasoned that the factors which are important in the
determination of the substantiality of an organization's lobbying
activities are so complex as to resist quantification, and therefore
that a percentage test was generally not workable. In Seasongood
v. Commissioner,7 however, the Sixth Circuit did conclude that
where less than five percent of an organization's efforts and activi-
ties was devoted to attempts to influence legislation, the organiza-
tion had not engaged in substantial lobbying. Seasongood is some-
" Id. at 380 (quoting Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 1, § 812(d), 53 Stat. 124 (now
I.R.C. § 501(c)(3)).
11 The Exempt Organizations Handbook, Internal Revenue Manual 7751 § 394
(1977). With regard to a definition of "substantial," the only guidance that the
Handbook gives to agents is that the determination is a factual one and that there
is no simple rule.
" 227 F.2d 907 (6th Cir. 1955).
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what anomalous in that, in reversing the decision of the Tax
Court, ' which had included detailed findings of fact regarding the
attempts of the taxpayer's organization to influence legislation,
the Sixth Circuit seems to have based its finding that less than five
percent of the time and effort of the organization was involved in
lobbying on the bare statement of the taxpayer, which the court
said was "not successfully challenged either by adversary wit-
nesses or destructive analysis."' 9 This case would seem to be of
extremely limited value as precedent.
While it is possible to isolate a number of the factors which
courts have found important in determining the substantiality of
an organization's lobbying, the section 501(c)(3) organizations
have found it very difficult to anticipate when their attempts to
influence legislation approach a substantial level. It should be
noted that only for the last six years have organizations had the
limited guidance of Christian Echoes. Haswell was decided even
more recently. Prior to these decisions there was practically no
guidance as to how substantiality would be determined. In the
hearings which led to the enactment of sections 501(h) and 4911,
charitable organizations pointed out that this absence of guide-
lines left broad discretion to the I.R.S., and complained that there
was no consistent pattern of administration from one district to the
next.8 The charities argued further that the uncertainty of this
situation, when combined with the fact that the only sanction for
an I.R.S. determination of substantial lobbying was loss of exemp-
tion, chilled the often beneficial lobbying of the charities and de-
prived legislative bodies of information, which they both needed
and wanted.2' Congress did, of course, deal with these criticisms
by providing elective, objective standards for determining the sub-
stantiality of an organization's lobbying, and by cushioning the
effect of a finding that an organization had excess expenditures by,
first, imposing an excise tax on those excess expenditures and,
second, revoking the exempt status of the organization only when
its lobbying expenditures are "normally" over 150 percent of the
threshold lobbying nontaxable amount. The remainder of this arti-
cle is devoted to the considerations which should go into a public
, 22 T.C. 671 (1954).
, 227 F.2d at 912.
Hearings on H.R. 10612 Before the Senate Committee on Finance, 94th
Cong., 2nd Sess. 3263 (1976) (statement of Elvis Stahr, Chairman, Coalition of
Concerned Charities).
21 Id. at 3264.
[Vol. 81
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charity's decision of whether to make the election to come under
these objective standards.
CONSIDERATIONS IN MAKING THE SECTION 501(h) ELECTION
With the introduction of section 501(h) to the Internal Reve-
nue Code by the Tax Reform Act of 1976, eligible section 501(c) (3)
organizations must face the issue of whether to exercise the elec-
tion to have the substantiality of their lobbying determined under
the new expenditure tests or simply to take no positive action in
this regard and thus remain under the standards of prior law.
There is no simple answer which is "right" for all organizations.
There are, however, several factors which should be considered in
deciding whether to make the section 501(h) election, any one of
which may be determinative for a given organization. These in-
clude (1) the eligibility of the organization to make the election,
(2) the administrative burdens placed on an electing organization,
(3) the political sensitivity of the organization's objectives, (4) the
nature of the organization's activities, and (5) the sanctions for
violating the standards.
Eligibility
Eligibility to make the section 501(h) election is, of course, the
threshold consideration for any section 501(c)(3) organization
wishing to come under the new provisions. The statute restricts the
organizations to which section 501(h) applies to the public chari-
ties, excepting only those organizations which are support organi-
zations for section 501(c)(4) social welfare organizations, section
501(c)(5) labor unions, and section 501(c)(6) trade associations and
"disqualified organizations," a term which is defined to encompass
churches, integrated auxiliaries of churches, and organizations af-
filiated with churches or their integrated auxiliaries." Although
the exempt status of a private foundation is dependent on the
insubstantiality of its lobbying activities, the private foundations
have since 1969 been subject to an excise tax on lobbying expendi-
tures under section 4945,2 and are not eligible to make the section
501(h) election.
Of particular note is the disqualification of churches and re-
lated organizations. This provision was included in the statute at
the request of a number of church groups which took the position
2 I.R.C. § 501(h)(3)-(4).
1 I.R.C. § 4945.
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that any restriction on the lobbying of religious organizations is an
unconstitutional restraint on the first amendment right of free
exercise of religion, and that if Congress designated churches as
organizations permitted to elect under the new rules, the I.R.S.
might infer a congressional intent to enforce the lobbying restric-
tions against churches even if the churches did not in fact make
the election.24 The churches sought this exclusion even though in
the one decision which addressed this constitutional issue,
Christian Echoes National Ministry, Inc. v. United States,25 the
Tenth Circuit held that the limitations on lobbying in section
501(c)(3) are constitutionally valid, reasoning that first amend-
ment rights are not absolute and that in the face of a compelling
governmental interest (i.e., guaranteeing the separation of church
and state), a limited restraint (i.e., the denial of tax exempt sta-
tus) is permissible. By disqualifying churches from electing under
the new provisions, Congress sought to remain neutral on this con-
stitutional issue, and indeed the Committee reports provide that
the legislation is not to be regarded as either approval or disap-
proval of the decision of the Tenth Circuit in Christian Echoes."
It is not only churches which are disqualified from making the
election. Any organization is disqualified if it is an integrated aux-
iliary of a church or a convention or association of churches, or if
it is a member of an affiliated group of organizations if one or more
members of such group is a church or an integrated auxiliary of a
church.Y Section 4911(f)(2) defines what is meant by affiliation in
this context: Two organizations are members of an affiliated group
if (1) the governing instrument of one of the organizations requires
it to be bound by the decisions of the other with regard to legisla-
tive issues (i.e., issues on which the organization might lobby), or
(2) the governing board of one of the organizations includes persons
who (i) are specifically designated representatives of the other or-
ganization or are members of the governing board, officers, or paid
executive staff members of that other organization and (ii) by
aggregating their votes those persons have sufficient voting power
to cause or prevent action on legislative issues by the first organiza-
tion.n But what is meant by an "integrated auxiliary of a church"
in this context is not certain. When this legislation was first re-
2, H.R. REP. No. 94-1210, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1976).
470 F.2d 849 (10th Cir. 1972).
H.R. REP. No. 94-1210, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1976).
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ported, the House Ways and Means Committee adopted the defi-
nition provided in sections 6033, 508(c), and 6043(b) in the then
outstanding proposed regulations. The proposed regulations de-
fined an "integrated auxiliary of a church" as
an organization described in section 501(c)(3), (a) whose pri-
mary purpose is to carry out the tenets, functions, and princi-
ples of faith of the church with which it is affiliated, and (b)
whose operations in implementing such primary purpose di-
rectly promote religious activity among the members of the
church."
Under this definition, organizations considered to be integrated
auxiliaries include the men's and women's clubs of religious organ-
izations, mission societies, and theological seminaries; however,
schools of a general academic or vocational nature, hospitals, or-
phanages, and old age homes, which are associated with churches
but which are the types of organizations frequently established
without regard to church relationships, would not be considered to
be integrated auxiliaries, and thus would not be disqualified from
making the section 501(h) election. The Conference Committee
chose to take no position with regard to the application of the
definition of an integrated auxiliary provided in these proposed
regulations," and, indeed, when the regulations were finalized cer-
tain changes were made so that now an organization affiliated with
a church will be considered an integrated auxiliary for purposes of
section 6033 if the principal activity of the organization is exclu-
sively religious, i.e., if it applied for exemption on its own it would
qualify for exemption as a religious organization.3 1 While the Serv-
ice is free to redefine an integrated auxiliary in the context of
section 501(h), until regulations are issued under these new provi-
sions, the definition in the regulations under section 6033 is the
only indication of an administrative position, and an organization
whose primary objective is identical to that of the corresponding
exempt secular organization is probably free to make the section
501(h) election.
The Administrative Burden
An eligible organization wishing to come under the specific
limitations of sections 501(h) and 4911 must make an affirmative
election and meet certain reporting requirements which make pos-
2' Prop. Treas. Reg. § 2.6033-2(g) (1976).
H.R. RPP. No. 94-1515, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 533 (1976).
:' Treas. Reg. § 1.6033-2(g)(5), T.D. 7454, 1977-1 C.B. 366.
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sible the enforcement of the limitations. Initially the organization
must file an election (Form 5768) at the appropriate Internal Reve-
nue Service Center prior to the end of the first taxable year for
which the election is to be effective.32 Then for each taxable year
for which the election is effective, section 6033(b)(8) requires the
organization to include with its annual return the following infor-
mation: the amount of its lobbying expenditures, its lobbying non-
taxable amount, the amount of its grass roots expenditures, and
its grass roots nontaxable amount. If the organization is a mem-
ber of an affiliated group as defined in section 4911(f), then the
return must also include these amounts with respect to the affili-
ated group.?
In order to be able to supply the required information, an
electing organization will have to keep a detailed account of its
"exempt purpose expenditures," since the computation of the or-
ganization's lobbying nontaxable amount (and therefore its grass
roots nontaxable amount) is based on the amount of such expendi-
tures. "Exempt purpose expenditures" is defined by section
4911(e) to include not only the direct expenditures for the organi-
zation's exempt purpose but also the expenses of administering the
charitable programs of the organization, all amounts paid or in-
curred for lobbying, 3 and a reasonable allowance for depreciation
of the organization's capital assets used for these purposes. 7
Amounts paid or incurred for the fundraising unit of the organiza-
tion are not "exempt purpose expenditures";3' and it is not unrea-
sonable to suppose that the Service will require that an appropri-
ate portion of the organization's overhead expenses be allocated to
the fundraising unit. Finally, it should be noted that the expenses
of carrying on a trade or business which are unrelated to the organ-
ization's exempt purpose, and thus produce "unrelated business
taxable income," are not exempt purpose expenditures."
"Lobbying expenditures" and "grass roots expenditures" are
defined terms and will have to be accounted for in accordance with
31 I.R.C. § 501(h)(6).
3 I.R.C. § 6033(b)(8). This and all other information required to be furnished
on the organization's information return will be made available to the public pur-




' I.R.C. § 4911(e)(4).
I.R.C. § 4911(e)(1)(c)(i).
See Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(d)(3).
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the statute. Accounting for such expenditures will involve deci-
sions with regard to which actions of the organization are attempts
to influence legislation," as well as determinations of the costs of
such actions. An excerpt from the explanation of the statute's
requirements contained in the report of the House Ways and
Means Committee is illustrative:
[11f an organization communicates with a member or employee
of a legislative body and one of the purposes is influencing legis-
lation, then the appropriate portion of the costs of that effort
are to be treated as lobbying expenditures. If the communica-
tion is with a government official or employee who is not in a
legislative body, then the costs of the communication are to be
taken into account only if the principal purpose of the commu-
nication is to influence legislation.'
With some justification, the administrator of the public charity
may balk when faced with the prospect of having to make (and
justify) such determinations on a recurring basis.
Having avoided private foundation status and thus the ad-
ministrative, accounting, and reporting requirements of Chapter
42 of the Code, public charities are generally able to hold non-
program-related expenses to a minimum. In the typical situation,
the reporting requirements of public charities are minimal; such
organizations are required to account for expenditures only in
terms of broadly defined categories.2 The detailed provisions of
section 4911 and the reporting requirements of section 6033(b)(8)
will impose an additional administrative burden on any organiza-
tion making the section 501(h) election. The extent of this burden
will depend to some extent on the existing administrative structure
and capability of the organization. But electing organizations must
face the fact that resources will be diverted from charitable pur-
poses when time and attention of the organization's administrative
staff are devoted to meeting the statute's reporting requirements
and when it becomes necessary to utilize outside professional help
to deal with problems which arise in interpreting the statute or in
accounting for expenditures.
The Avoidance of Subjective Enforcement
One theme running through the hearings which led to the
so See discussion in text accompanying notes 48-62, infra.
" H.R. REp. No. 94-1210, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1976).
2 I.R.C. § 6033(h)(I)-(7).
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introduction of sections 501(h) and 4911 to the Code was that the
lack of precise administrative guidelines defining substantiality
resulted in inconsistent enforcement of the restrictions on the
lobbying of section 501(c) (3) organizations. Witnesses testifying on
behalf of the charitable organizations charged that the law gave
District Directors, revenue agents, and other I.R.S. officials broad
discretion, which at times was abused in order to challenge the
actions and to suppress the views of organizations with which they
disagreed." Furthermore, witnesses claimed that the absence of a
determinable standard nurtured an uneven and selective enforce-
ment of the statute." Christian Echoes National Ministry, Inc. v.
United States" is an example of this selective enforcement and of
another factor which plays a significant role in this area: the desire
of the I.R.S. to successfully prosecute and publicize selected cases
in areas where the law's parameters have not been clearly defined
in order to encourage voluntary and restrained compliance. In
Christian Echoes, the district court found that other churches and
associations of churches engaged in lobbying activities similar to
those of Christian Echoes, and that Christian Echoes was chosen
as the subject of the exempt status revocation because of its rela-
tively small size which simplified the investigatory process, and to
serve as a warning to other organizations engaging in such conduct.
The district court held that this rather arbitrary selection of Chris-
tian Echoes was a violation of the organization's rights under the
fifth amendment. The Tenth Circuit reversed, holding that unless
based on an unacceptable classification such as race, religion, or
politics, selective enforcement does not result in a denial of the
fifth amendment right to due process."
Prior to the changes instituted by the Tax Reform Act of 1976,
because of the absence of standards and the lack of prerevocation
judicial review, an administrative threat of loss of exemption due
to substantial lobbying, however unjustified, was generally suffi-
cient to bring the organization's activity into conformity with the
demands of the I.R.S. The section 501(h) election provides organi-
zations dealing in controversial or administratively sensitive areas
with a safe harbor, within which they can maneuver without worry
of arbitrary administrative action. The section 7428 declaratory
1 See, e.g., Hearings on H.R. 13720 Before the House Ways and Means
Comm., 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 222 (1972) (statement of Stuart Johnson).
" Id. at 177.
470 F.2d 849 (10th Cir. 1972).
" Id. at 857.
[Vol. 81
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judgment procedure is an additional safeguard available to both
electing and nonelecting organizations."7 But the objective stan-
dards under which electing organizations operate provide a degree
of certainty not available to nonelecting organizations.
The Nature of the Organization's Activities
An important consideration in any eligible organization's de-
termination of whether to exercise the section 501(h) election is
whether, and to what extent, its activities could be classified as
"carrying on propaganda, or otherwise attempting, to influence
legislation. '" 8 In this regard, it should be noted that there is a
variance as to what activities come within this statutory phrase for
electing and for nonelecting organizations. The section 4911 defini-
tion of "influencing legislation,"4 which is only to apply to organi-
zations making the section 501(h) election, is somewhat narrower
than the definition given by the Service and the courts prior to the
enactment of these provisions. Because of this variance, it is possi-
ble for a nonelecting organization which remains subject to prior
law to lose its exemption on the basis of those activities' expenses
which would not have been considered lobbying expenditures
under section 4911. The important issue in determining whether
to make the section 501(h) election is whether under prior law a
substantial part of the organization's activities might be regarded
as "carrying on propaganda, or otherwise attempting, to influence
legislation."
The regulations state that an organization will be regarded as
attempting to influence legislation if it
(a) Contacts, or urges the public to contact, members of a legis-
lative body for the purpose of proposing, supporting, or oppos-
ing legislation; or
(b) Advocates the adoption or rejection of legislation."
In accordance with this regulation, the I.R.S. takes the position
that "influencing legislation" includes both direct and grass roots
lobbying, and that the motive of the lobbyist or the fact that the
advocated legislation will further the charitable purpose of the
organization is irrelevant." The weight of judicial authority is in
" I.R.C. § 7428.
" I.R.C. § 501(c)(3).
I.R.C. § 4911(d).
" Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(3)(ii), T.D. 7428, 1976-2 C.B. 160.
' Rev. Rul. 67-293, 1967-2 C.B. 185.
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accord with this view.5" "Legislation" is defined by the Regulations
to include "action by the Congress, by any State legislature, by
any local council or similar governing body, or by the public in a
referendum, initiative, constitutional amendment, or similar pro-
cedure.513 "Legislation" includes foreign as well as domestic laws."
It should be noted that this definition excludes action by an execu-
tive branch or its administrative agencies (for example, a school
board or the Food and Drug Administration), although, of course,
urging members of an executive branch to support an action by the
legislature is "influencing legislation."
Four primary categories of activity have been excepted from
the regulations' definition of "influencing legislation." Discus-
sions and analyses of (and the distribution of reports on) broad
social and economic problems which are not directed toward spe-
cific legislation are not considered to be attempts to influence leg-
islation.5 Making available the results of nonpartisan analysis,
study, or research is also an activity excepted from the definition.
Such nonpartisan analysis need not be neutral; but in contrast to
propaganda, the presentation of the facts and issues must be bal-
anced, fair, and complete, and must explain the opposing points
of view. 6 The third category of excepted activity is making avail-
able technical advice or assistance to a governmental body or com-
mittee in response to a written request."7 Finally, there seems to
be no question that a charitable organization may initiate contacts
with the legislative body with respect to a possible decision which
might affect the organization's existence, powers and duties, tax
exempt status, or its right to receive deductible contributions,
without running afoul of the restrictions on influencing legisla-
tion.58
52 See, e.g., Haswell v. United States, 500 F.2d 1133 (Ct. Cl. 1974); Christian
Echoes National Ministry, Inc. v. United States, 470 F.2d 849 (10th Cir. 1972);
League of Women Voters of United States v. United States, 180 F. Supp. 379 (Ct.
Cl. 1960); Roberts Dairy Co. v. Comm'r, 195 F.2d 948 (8th Cir. 1952). But see
Seasongood v. Comm'r, 277 F.2d 907 (6th Cir. 1955).
Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(3)(ii), T.D. 7428, 1976-2 C.B. 160.
51 Rev. Rul. 73-440, 1973-2 C.B. 177.
Rev. Rul. 70-79, 1970-1 C.B. 127.
"1 Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(3)(iv), T.D. 7428, 1976-2 C.B. 160; Rev. Rul.
68-263, 1968-1 C.B. 256; Rev. Rul. 64-195, 1964-2 C.B. 138.
Rev. Rul. 70-449, 1970-2 C.B. 111.
s In 1969 Congress imposed an excise tax on amounts expended by private
foundations to influence legislation. The definition of influencing legislation which
applies in the private foundation context appears at I.R.C. § 4945(e), and contains
the final three noted exceptions. While the definition does not expressly apply to
[Vol. 81
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While it is clear that direct lobbying of members of a legisla-
tive body and indirect lobbying by -means of appeals to public
opinion with regard to legislative matters are attempts to influence
legislation, it is not entirely clear to what extent the organization's
support activities will be considered to be a part of those attempts.
This problem is illustrated by the decision of the Court of Claims
in League of Women Voters of United States v. United States.59
The League admitted to only insubstantial direct lobbying, but the
Courf accepted the government's argument that the League's ex-
tensive program of research and discussion which led to the formu-
lation of a legislative program was all a part of a substantial effort
by the League to influence legislation. This decision stands as a
warning that attempts to influence legislation do not necessarily
begin at the moment of contact with the legislator or the first
appeal to the public.
Against this background of the activities which are considered
to be "attempts to influence legislation" under the law prior to the
enactment of sections 501(h) and 4911, and which will continue to
be so considered for organizations not making the section 501(h)
election, stands the section 4911(d) definition of "influencing legis-
lation." While this definition is in most respects identical to that
of prior law,"0 section 4911(d) excepts two additional categories
from the activities which will be considered to be influencing legis-
lation.' The more important of these exceptions allows communi-
cation between the organization and its bona fide members unless
the communication directly encourages the members to lobby.
Under this exception the efforts of the members of the League of
Women Voters in the formulation of their legislative program
would not have been considered a part of the organization's at-
tempts to influence legislation. The second new category of ex-
cepted activity allows communication with government officials or
employees who are not members or employees of a legislative body,
provided that the principal purpose of the communication is not
to influence legislation. This exception eliminates the necessity
public charities, the I.R.S. has apparently tacitly accepted the definition's applica-
tion to all 501(c)(3) organizations.
180 F. Supp. 379 (Ct. Cl. 1960).
'o While the broad social policy exception does not appear in the statute, it
applies equally to electing organizations. This is so because it deals with the issue
of what is "influencing legislation" while the other exceptions are of activities which
are influencing legislation, but are not considered so because of legislative or ad-
ministrative grace.
11 I.R.C. § 4911(d)(2)-(3).
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of allocating at least a portion of the costs of such communication
to lobbying expenditures.
These additional exceptions to "influencing legislation,"
which, in effect, narrow the scope of activities considered t'o be
lobbying for organizations making the section 501(h) election, can
be a significant factor in the decision of many organizations con-
sidering whether to make that election. Generally, however, the
more important difference in the limitations on lobbying of elect-
ing organizations and nonelecting organizations is the fact that
the substantiality of the lobbying of electing organizations is
determined solely on the basis of the amount of lobbying expen-
ditures vis-a-vis the organization's exempt purpose expenditures.
Thus an organization whose legislative program is implemented
largely by the use of volunteers, or an organization which by effi-
cient management is able to sustain significant legislative activity
at a minimal cost, is able to make the section 501(h) election to
come within the expenditure limitations and to continue its legis-
lative program without being threatened with the revocation of
its exemption on that basis. This is especially beneficial to mem-
bership organizations which, by virtue of the size and commitment
of their memberships, are able to mobilize large groups of people
at a minimal expense.
An organization which takes a public position on pending leg-
islation or which contacts a participant in the legislative process
with regard to legislation (unless it falls within one of the noted
exceptions) is engaging in lobbying. If an organization engages in
such activity to any extent, it should make a judgment with regard
to the substantiality of its efforts based on the criteria established
in Christian Echoes, Haswell, and League of Women Voters. 2 If,
under the construction of the facts most favorable to the govern-
ment, a finding of substantiality might be made, then the organi-
zation should either reduce its legislative activity or consider
whether, based on the amounts of its lobbying expenditures and
exempt purpose expenditures, it might fit within the safe harbor
limitations of section 501(h). If it can fit within the expenditure
limitations, the organization may make the section 501(h) election
and continue its lobbying activity unchecked. But if its lobbying
expenditures exceed the 501(h) limits and under the alternative
standard a finding of substantiality is possible, the organization
must reduce its legislative activity. The sanctions imposed on a
charitable organization which is found to be in violation of the
12 See discussion in text accompanying notes 9-16, supra.
[Vol. 81
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limitations on lobbying are so extreme as not to be an acceptable
risk.
Sanctions
If a charitable organization is found to have engaged in sub-
stantial lobbying, the tax exempt status of that organization will
be revoked. Since no objective index of substantiality exists for
nonelecting organizations, it is possible for such organizations
which have not exercised an adequate degree of caution to be
caught without warning. In contrast, substantiality for an electing
organization depends on an objective standard based on the
amount of the organization's lobbying expenditures vis-a-vis its
exempt purpose expenditures. An electing organization is first sub-
jected to an excise tax of 25 percent on excess lobbying expendi-
tures and only loses its exemption if its lobbying expenditures
normally exceed a ceiling amount. This two-tiered system of sanc-
tions, when combined with the statutory record keeping require-
ments, make the electing organization acutely aware of its status
with regard to the ultimate sanction of loss of exemption.
While the loss of status as a section 501(c)(3) organization due
to excess lobbying (and the accompanying loss of the right to re-
ceive deductible contributions) is a devastating blow, prior to the
Tax Reform Act of 1976 an organization finding itself in this situa-
tion was able to remain exempt on its own income as a social
welfare organization under section 501(c)(4),63 and was thus often
able to survive. This switch in status from section 501(c)(3) to
section 501(c)(4) enabled organizations to build up an endowment
out of deductible contributions as a charitable organization and
then to use that endowment to support substantial lobbying efforts
as a social welfare organization. Congress therefore enacted section
504, which provides that a section 501(c)(3) organization which
loses that status by reason of excessive lobbying cannot at any time
thereafter be treated as a section 501(c) (4) social welfare organiza-
tion. Without the availability of the section 501(c)(4) status, the
loss of exemption will almost necessarily be a killing blow to a
charitable organization.
A final consideration for those organizations which have ex-
isted as public charities with significant legislative programs prior
to the 1976 Reform Act, is that the availability of this election may
lead to a shift in the administrative approach of the I.R.S. The
61 Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-1(c)(3)(v), T.D. 7428, 1976-2 C.B. 160.
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previous harshness of a determination of excessive lobbying is now
tempered by the availability at the organization's election of the
new standard with its gradient sanctions. The fact that an organi-
zation now, in effect, chooses to come under the facts and circum-
stances test of prior law may lead the Service to take a somewhat
harder line and to give closer scrutiny to the legislative activities
of nonelecting organizations.
CONCLUSION
The Tax Reform Act of 1976 has presented a choice for public
charities which should neither be ignored nor exercised blindly.
For a public charity engaging in significant legislative activity, the
section 501(h) election provides a safe harbor within which the
organization may continue to lobby without risking its exempt
status. But this election entails a significant administrative bur-
den which need not be undertaken by organizations whose legisla-
tive activity is insubstantial even under the government's most
expansive view of attempts to influence legislation. The situation
of each public charity should be evaluated in light of the considera-
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